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Introduction
Access to and utilization of health services continue to pose problems for developing countries. This is a serious concern since major illness is one of the most substantial and unpredictable shocks to economic well-being that most households will face. The costs associated with negative health shocks are two-fold, related to medical treatment and to a reduction in working ability. The importance of both these costs can generate substantial welfare losses to households (Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2007) . Families may be forced to sell productive assets or remove children from school which can generate intergenerational poverty transmission.
Furthermore, delaying medical treatment or choosing self-treatment can generate serious health consequences (Hadley 2002) . Particularly susceptible are young children. Biological insults during infancy can generate nutritional deficits and affect the development of diverse skills as well as biological processes, which in turn determine cognitive outcomes in adulthood.
Furthermore, negative health outcomes affect school attendance and child productivity (Miguel and Kremer 2004) . These negative effects on cognitive abilities can potentially hinder a country's economic development due to the potential loss of human capital (Currie and Hyson 1999) . If implemented correctly, health insurance systems could provide an effective solution to these various challenges (Brown et al. 1998; Gertler and Gruber 2002) . This paper is the first study to examine the causal impact of participation in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana on health care utilization using representative data for the entire country and controlling for the endogenous nature of insurance enrollment.
The literature on the impact of insurance coverage is quite extensive but it has mainly examined US evidence. US studies have shown effectively that membership in insurance schemes expand healthcare utilization but have been less successful when assessing its impact on health outcomes (Currie and Gruber, 1996; Aizer 2007; Card et al, 2008; Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; Card et al 2009; Finkelstein et al, 2012) . Recently, advances in the evaluation of the impact of health insurance enrollment on health care utilization and health outcomes in developing countries have been achieved (Acharya et al. forthcoming) . Yet with few exceptions (King et al. 2009 , Thorton et al. 2010 and Asuming 2013 , these studies have not been able to tackle endogeneity and selection issues successfully. Moreover, the findings in terms of increases in health care utilization due to scheme participation are not consistent.
Our paper contributes to the health insurance literature in various ways. First, it provides causal evidence of the impact of health insurance participation on health behaviors. The decision to join a health insurance scheme is determined by unobserved factors, and these same factors might simultaneously be affecting the level of health care use and its quality. In contrast to other causal studies (King et al. 2009 , Miller et al. 2009 , Thorton et al. 2010 and Asuming 2013 our study estimates the impact of the NHIS on health behaviors analyzing data that is representative for the whole country and does not rely on a randomized controlled trial or a regression discontinuity design that limits the population analyzed to particular geographic areas or income groups. All previous studies looking in to the Ghanaian scheme have used very limited data in terms of its geographic coverage (Sulzbach 2008 , Chankova et al. 2009 Pace 2010, Blanchet et al. 2012 , Asuming 2013 . The results of this study can be more easily generalized to the entire population, since the number of potential treatment locations, as well as locally available health resources, are representative for all of the country. Second, our paper studies a wide range of outcomes. In addition to looking at the frequency of prenatal care we also investigate the impact of insurance participation on the quality of such care. To our knowledge, no study to date has analyzed the impact of the Ghanaian National Health Insurance Scheme on the availability of higher quality prenatal care.
The studies that have previously examined the impact of the NHIS are in most cases very restricted in terms of the population analyzed and with only one exception (Asuming 2013) have not dealt with the endogeneity of insurance choice appropriately. Mensah et al. 2009 (also published as Mensah et al. 2010 ) used the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology to find that pregnant women who participate in the scheme enjoy reduced incidence of birth complications and are more likely to receive prenatal care, deliver at a hospital, and be attended by a trained health professional during birth. Mensah et al. 2009 looks at the impact of the scheme on only 4 districts in Ghana. Blanchet et al. 2012 also employ PSM and use data that is restricted to the Accra Metropolitan Area. They show that insurance members have a higher probability of obtaining prescriptions, visiting clinics and seeking formal health care when sick.
Similarly, Sulzbach (2008) uses PSM and data from two districts to analyze the impact of enrollment in the NHIS. The author finds the insured are more likely to seek curative care. Chankova et al. (2009) use a repeated cross-sectional study of the same districts to look at the same outcomes as Sulzbach with very similar results. Brugiavini and Pace (2010) is the only previous study that uses data from the whole country. They find that participation in the NHIS increases the probability of attending prenatal care, of delivering at a formal health facility and of being assisted by a professional during delivery. The authors mostly use simple Probit estimates and eventually introduce an IV estimation technique but the instrument chosen (a binary variable for the health care reform in 2005) is not shown to be either exogenous or strong. Finally, using a RCT design Asuming 2013 finds that insurance coverage leads to increased utilization of healthcare services, a decrease of out-of-pocket spending and fewer days of illness suffered.
Though his estimates are causal, his analysis is confined to the Wa West district in north-western Ghana, a particular poor and remote rural district, hence the results are not nationally representative.
To overcome the selection bias and omitted variable bias present in the estimation of the effect of joining a health insurance scheme on health care use and quality we use an instrumental variable approach. The exogenous variation in the decision to join the NHIS comes from unexpected variations in the membership rules in the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) which lead to reduced costs and less cumbersome enrollment procedures and hence higher participation rates.
The main data sets employed in this study are the 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS) as well as a census of all the DMHIS in existence in 2008. This census containing administrative data at the district level was carried out for the purpose of this study and allows us to construct the instrumental variable used in the paper. We control for local differences in labor market structures and the quantity and quality of health care delivery in each district, to prove these factors are not driving our results. We test the exogeneity of the instrument by providing evidence to show the membership rule chosen as the instrument was not altered by government officials in the different DMHIS to make it less stringent in districts that had: lower child health care utilization rates or maternal health care quality or higher poverty, malaria or fertility rates.
We further test the validity of the instruments in the robustness checks sub-section where we show than if we include an additional instrument (less strong but still valid) the Hansen JStatistic confirms that the instruments are indeed exogenous. This paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, Section two provides a background of the National Health Insurance Scheme operation. Section three describes the data used in the analysis and the estimation method chosen. This is followed by Section four which presents results, a discussion of the findings and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme
From the colonial era through the 1970s, Ghana's governments tried various policies to render health care financing sustainable in the country (Abuosi 2004) . Prior to 1989, health facilities were allowed to keep some of the fees collected to improve upon their services (Baah 1994) .
After 1989, the health institutions were authorized to keep all fees collected to facilitate capitalization for the so-called "Cash and Carry" scheme for drug purchases and supply. This scheme was implemented in 1992 and is formally known as the Revolving Drug Fund (Yevutsey and Aikins 2010).
Under the cash-and-carry system, health professionals only attended to patient needs after initial payment for the service was made. Even patients who had been brought into the hospital on emergencies had to pay at every point of service delivery. This resulted in unnecessary suffering and death, leading to public outcry for the scheme to be scrapped (Agbeve, 1997) .
In 2003 the National Health Insurance Act (Act 560) was passed. This act created Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), whose mission is "to ensure equitable universal access for all residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality of essential health services without outof-pocket payment being required at the point of service use" (Ghana Ministry of Health, 2004) .
The scheme became operational in 2004 (Hsiao and Shaw 2007) .
The new system establishes that people pay an annual fee according to their income i . The average premium paid by the informal sector (which constitutes the majority of the Ghanaian population) is around 10 Ghana Cedis which is around 2.5% of the annual per capita income estimated from the last Ghana Living Standard Survey (GSS, 2008) . There is no limit on what the NHIS pays in medical bills as long as the care is within the provision of the benefit package.
Finally, there are no co-payments, co-insurance or deductibles.
The government subsidizes pensioners under the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) Scheme, and, in addition, under the NHIS, subsidizes the old (70+), core indigent populations, and the children and dependents below 18 of parents that participate in the system.
These exempt groups are not required to pay premiums, but they must be registered to obtain coverage. In addition, starting in July 2008 pregnant women were also exempted from paying premiums (Witter and Garshong 2009 ), but still needed to be enrolled to benefit.
The NHIS operates Ghana's public health care system ii and allows the existence of three different kinds of insurance plans (District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes, private mutual insurance schemes and private commercial insurance schemes). Within these schemes the benefits package offered is very similar iii . It covers over 95% of the disease conditions that afflict
Ghanaians.
The most popular plan is the District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS), which operates in every district in Ghana. The other insurance plans cover less than 1% of the insured population iv . Hence, in the rest of the paper when we referred to a person being insured or covered by the NHIS we actually refer to people that are insured exclusively by a DMHIS. Each DMHIS is responsible for establishing a district administration, enrolling and maintaining membership, collecting contributions from people who can pay, applying a means test to determine who is indigent and processing claims from accredited facilities. The DMHIS do not run the health care providers or even accredit these health facilities. It is the National Health insurance authority (NHIA), the central administrator of the scheme, who is in charge of accrediting health facilities. Any resident in Ghana can register under this scheme v . This insurance scheme is the only one that receives a subsidy from the National Health Insurance
Fund and is the one analyzed in this paper.
The District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes are distributed across the different regions in Ghana and by 2008 had accredited 1,672 health facilities across the whole country (see Table A1 in the appendix). Similarly, the enrollment rate varies across regions with the lowest membership rates in the Central region and the highest in the Upper West region, with an average of 48% of people in Ghana holding a valid insurance card (see Table A2 in the appendix). According to the 
Estimation Methodology

Data Sources
The 2008 obvious that participants and non-participants in the insurance scheme are drastically different.
Participant mothers have fewer children, are older, more educated, and wealthier, have a higher probability of being Christian and married and of living in an urban area closer to health providers.
Outcomes analyzed
This paper focuses on two main types of outcomes: (i) quantity and quality of maternal health services received and (ii) curative child health care utilization. The first item comprises, the number of antenatal visits a woman had, if pregnant women were told about pregnancy complications during prenatal visits, if they had urine and blood samples taken during pregnancy, if they deliver at a health facility and if women had a postnatal check-up vi . The second category includes, if children younger than 5 years of age suffered a fever or cough in the previous two weeks, if parents treat their children with antimalarial medication when they are sick with either a fever or cough and if they get medical treatment when their children experience a fever or cough. Medical treatment implies going to a formal facility or health provider (either public or private) instead of seeking help from a drug peddler, traditional practitioner or shop/market or seeking not help at all.
This study mainly analyzes health care practices for children under five, because early health care experiences are particularly important for future skill development and establishment of mental potential (Knudsen et al. 2006; Heckman 2007 and Maluccio et al. 2009 ). Strong economic productivity in adulthood has been shown to be correlated to outcomes of child health (Case et al. 2002; Currie and Stabile 2003; Case et al. 2005; Alderman et al. 2006; Hoddinott et al. 2008 and Oreopoulos et al. 2008) . Moreover, in the aggregate, lower human capital will result in sluggish economic development (Strauss and Thomas 1998) .
The choice of these particular outcomes was not gratuitous. We cover all aspects of maternal care, from prenatal care quantity to its quality and furthermore we include post natal care. This allows us to see the whole spectrum of maternal care. We analyze the probability of malaria medication intake as well as the probability of seeking health advice for cases of fever/cough instead of other health conditions since malaria is the most common cause of out-patient (OPD) visits in Ghana (Asuming 2013) .
Not all the observations in the sample were used to analyze these outcomes given the restrictions imposed by the date the DMHIS were created in every district. Specifically when looking at the prenatal care variables we only analyzed women who live in districts where DMHIS were created at least 4 months before they gave birth. In doing so we make sure that the existence of health insurance in their district was relevant to their choice of prenatal care vii . Similarly, when looking at the probability of delivering at a health facility and getting post natal checkups we only analyze women whose children were born after the DMHIS were created in their districts viii . 
Identification Strategy
One of the main difficulties in identifying the effect of joining a health insurance scheme on to control for these community-level variables, since, despite the availability of a health insurance program, families might not decide to join the scheme if they perceive the services they could access through this system as deficient. This may be the case when health facilities are too far to access or are of poor quality due to the lack of qualified health personnel or medical supplies. Simultaneously, the lack of high quality medical attention would reduce the likelihood of parents' taking a child to a health center, regardless of health insurance registration status.
Similarly, we control for other types of barriers to health care access in a district which also hinder participation in a DMHIS such as: (i) the lack of health care facilities and providers of high quality in the district; (ii) the existence of a poor road network in the district; (iii) the high prevalence of divorce or single parenthood in the district; and (iv) the low levels of education in the district as well as the preference for traditional medicine or self-medication. We collected this information in the 2008 DMHIS Census performed for this study. Hence in this study we are able to provide for controls for both the quantity and quality of health services at the district level which can affect simultaneously health care use and enrollment in the insurance scheme.
Nonetheless, time-variant and invariant characteristics that are not observed, and that cannot be controlled directly for, remain a concern. The observed relationship between the health care utilization level (Ct) and the choice to be insured (It) in a heterogeneous (in µt) population can be depicted as:
In other words, what we observe is not the casual or structural relationship between insurance membership and health care use (FI). Component Fµ x dµt/dIt will differ from zero if the decision to join a health insurance scheme is determined by unobserved factors that could simultaneously impact the health care utilization level chosen for the child and mother. In developing countries different selection processes can bias this observed relationship. Pregnant women with riskier behaviors or less knowledge of pregnancy (1 st time mothers) could enroll less frequently in insurance schemes (dµt/dIt<0) but they could still be aware of their own frailty or be afraid of the unknown and hence request more prenatal care (both in quantity and quality) than the average woman (Fµ>0). Similarly, parents with children with the lower health capital are the ones who usually do not prioritize preventive health care behaviors such as enrolling in a health insurance scheme (dµt/dIt<0). Yet these parents, with frailer children, would probably need to take their children more often to the doctor for curative care (Fµ>0). In contrast, parents that have healthier children and in general better preventative care could enroll more often in health insurance schemes (dµt/dIt>0). Health insurance enrolment is indeed often higher among wealthier households, which tend to be healthier. Yet these parents could take their children less often to the doctor when sick since they know of their child inherent strength (confidence selection = Fµ<0). Similarly, healthier pregnant women (due to less riskier behaviors) or women with more experience with pregnancy could be more prone to self-select into health insurance schemes (to avoid risks) yet use prenatal and postnatal services less often since they might feel they don't need them as much. This combination creates reverse causality and will end up generating a negative bias when estimating the relationship between insurance participation and health behaviors using OLS.
We use an instrumental variable approach to identify the causal impact of insurance enrollment on maternal and child health related behaviors. The exogenous variation in the decision to join the National Health Insurance system comes from unexpected variations in the membership rules in the District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes. We would expect parental participation to be higher in districts where costs are lower and the enrollment process is less cumbersome. The fee structure for the DMHIS is composed of (i) an annual premium or membership payments required to enroll for the first time, (ii) a renewal fee to be paid for each additional year of enrollment and (iii) a very small card processing fee to be paid once during the initial enrollment.
According to the NHIA regulations membership payments are supposed to be income-related, however this is only the case for the 3% of the population which are formal sector members (Gajate-Garrido and Owusua 2013). In practice, for informal members, there is a flat rate premium per person (this is the case in over 84% of the DMHIS surveyed) xv . According to the DMHIS census collected by this study, in 2008, the average annual premium nationwide for nonexempt adults was 10.6 GH¢ and the standard deviation in annual fees across districts was around 3.2 GH¢ (30% of the mean). In addition to the direct costs, there is also the easiness of verifying the existence of a membership which could add to how cumbersome the enrollment process is. The existence of non-standard verification methods (these are verification methods other than asking to see the parent's membership card or looking up their information in the system to ensure the parents were registered in the NHIS in order for their children to benefit) could disincentive enrollment. Examples of other verification methods include parents having to be present to register their children, and parents being asked to show their receipt. According to the DMHIS census, 18% of DMHIS analyzed in this study reported having non-standard verification methods (s.d. 38%) xvi .
At the beginning of the national health insurance scheme operation, given the decentralized approach adopted, districts had complete freedom to establish their membership rules. These rules were idiosyncratic to each district since they did not follow any official pattern or mandate.
Yet, it could still be argued that under certain circumstances membership rules could not be exogenous instruments. In particular it could be argued that districts with worse health outcomes or higher levels of poverty could have had worse human resources in their DMHIS (untrained or simply understaffed) which could have disincentive enrollment. To take care of that concern we use as an additional control a dummy equal to one if the DMHIS registered having any of these human resources constraints when they were interviewed for the census.
The membership rule that was finally chosen as the instrumental variable was the existence of non-standard verification methods in the DMHIS. We argue that the variation in verification methods after controlling for human resources quality does not reflect the hypothesized initial policy makers' objective function and could have been related to other time varying idiosyncratic shocks at the district level. In particular, the random variation in verification methods could be explained by a much extended phenomenon across years and districts in Ghana: the constant subdivision of districts. As mentioned when discussing the data, 110 districts existed in 2003.
However, by 2008 145 were in existence. Every time a district splits a new DMHIS has to open in the new district. These disruptions in the governance of the DMHIS could generate these unexpected variations.
Indeed to test this hypothesis we regress the existence of a non-standard verification method in 2008 on a series of controls including a dummy equal to one if the district originally belonged to a bigger district. We included too controls for other DMHIS characteristics that could affect the chosen IV but also other health care behaviors to make sure the choice of instrument was indeed exogenous and we clustered the standard errors at the district level. As it can be seen in Table 2 the only variables that are correlated with the choice of a non-standard verification methods are the population size in the region, the fact that the DMHIS belongs to the Accra region and most importantly the fact that the DMHIS is located in a district that used to be part of a bigger district. Being located in a previously subdivided district increase the probability of having nonstandard verification methods by 14.6%. However other membership rules such as the annual premium are not correlated with the choice of verification methods.
The division of districts could have affected the delivery of health care services too. Hence, as mentioned previously, we include as controls in the estimations both the quality of health care services delivered in the district as well as the number of health care facilities accredited pre district in both 2007 and 2008. Furthermore, the disruption in the public health sector was probably less significant than the one that occurred in the DMHIS since the government health service delivery structure is supported by a robust non-governmental sector (e.g. Christian Health
Association) that provides preventive and curative services and a private healthcare sector that provides some emergency services. In addition the delivery of health programs in Ghana is organized by the Ghana Health Services at a higher level that the district.
3.3.1
Testing the instruments' exogeneity. -As mentioned earlier, in theory, government officials in the different DMHIS could have established more relaxed membership rules in districts with initial worse social indicators (such as higher poverty rates, malaria rates or fertility rates or lower maternal education levels) or initial worse health care behaviors (such as lower child health care utilization rates or lower maternal health care quantity and quality). We test the exogeneity assumption using 2003 DHS data which contains the best health indicators available in Ghana at the time the NHIS was created and before the district rules were actually established.
The results found in Table A3 in the appendix and discussed in section A.2 reassure us that the instrument chosen is indeed exogenous and that our estimates are not biased.
Addressing sample selection and statistical issues. -In addition to the endogeneity issue,
there is also a concern about sample selection when looking at particular outcomes such as prenatal care quality and curative child health care utilization. In section A.3 in the Appendix we discuss how we dealt with sample selection for the relevant outcomes. Similarly, it should be mentioned that when dealing with dichotomous variables in both the first and the second stages of the IV estimation, the standard estimation techniques (2SLS) could not be appropriate. We discuss the appropriateness of our estimation technique in section A.4 in the Appendix.
Assessing the instrument's strength. -According to the first stage regressions
parameters (see Table 3 ) our instrument is relevant for all specifications. It is significant at a 1% level and display a non-immaterial effect on the probability of being covered by the NHIS. The existence of alternative verification methods in the district, which could make the enrollment process more cumbersome, decreases the probability of registration by around 16%.
Moreover, we assess the strength of the instrument using the first-stage F statistic. If the instruments is weak, the standard IV point estimates would be unreliable as well as the ensuing hypothesis tests xvii . The null hypothesis is that the instrument is weak. For all the estimations, the F statistic (at a 5% significance level) of the set of instruments chosen ensured that the maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS was no bigger than 10% for all outcomes. These results fit the definition of a non-weak instrument according to Stock et al. (2002) .
Specification
Our first stage equation is Our second stage equation is
where Cij is a child or maternal health care utilization choice, and (µij) are a set of unobserved attributes related to both the mother and the child such as resilience, maternal risk aversion, initiative and determination. Robust standard errors are calculated which are then clustered at the district level to account for any variation within district.
Results and Discussion
Models for maternal health care quantity and quality
The first set of estimations we perform is related to the quantity and quality of health care
received by pregnant women. The results both for OLS and IV estimations of the impact of being insured on maternal care behaviors are found in Table 4 . The odd columns show results without instrumenting insurance participation. For all the outcome variables, we instrument insurance participation using the existence of non-standard verification methods.
In Panel A the dependent variables are the number of prenatal visits sought during the last pregnancy the probability of being told about pregnancy complications during prenatal visits and the probability of having a urine sample taken during pregnancy. In Panel B the dependent variables analyzed are the probability of having a blood sample taken during pregnancy, the probability of delivering at a health facility and the likelihood of having a checkup after delivery.
For all the OLS estimations, NHIS participation appears to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of receiving higher quantity and quality maternal health care
services. The instrumental variable estimations similarly display, in all cases positive
coefficients, yet the magnitudes are much greater and some of the statistical significance is lost.
According to the IV estimations the only outcome which is not statistically significantly altered by being insured is the number of prenatal visits sought. In contrast, participating in the NHIS increases the likelihood of pregnant women being told about pregnancy complications during prenatal visits by 43.3 percentage points, it boosts the probability of having both a urine sample and a blood sample taken by 51.8 percentage points and 61.6 percentage points respectively.
Finally, insurance participation increases the probability of delivering at a health facility by 52.9
percentage points and it raises the likelihood of having a checkup after delivery by 63.1 percentage points.
It is not immediately clear why participation in the NHIS should increase the incidence of delivering in a health facility since even before the introduction of the NHIS deliveries at health facilities were free. Yet it should be mentioned that there is a huge difference in terms of insured mothers that deliver in a health facility (74%) and uninsured mothers that do (45%). In contrast, there is no difference in terms of the insured mothers that seek prenatal care in a health facility (99%) vs. uninsured mothers that do (98%). This means the health facilities are available to both but when delivering being insured increases dramatically the odds of accessing a health facility.
Insurance take up leads to better health knowledge and that could be potentially the causal mechanism by which insurance participation leads to differences in health facility utilization at delivery (even though these services are free). We tested if being insured increases the probability of knowing that tuberculosis can be cured and that having too many children is dangerous for a woman (variables associated to health knowledge in the female questionnaire).
We found it increases the former by 51.3 percentage points and the latter by 50.5 percentage points (statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively).
It should be acknowledge that the choice of quality of care in a developing country setting could be reflective of the type of health facility that the insured vs. the uninsured can attend. I.e. the facility type in the hierarchical structure of health facilities in Ghana, from CHPS compounds, health centers and clinics to district, regional hospitals and teaching hospitals. Availability and quality of skilled personnel, supplies and equipment differ by type of facility (e.g. Communitybased Health Planning and Services (CHPS) compounds do not have a doctor or medical assistant). So, a woman who chooses to use a CHPS compound for prenatal care but who does not have her blood sample taken may not necessarily be choosing lower quality care. Instead it could simply be the case that component was not available at the only facility within reasonable distance to her. This could be a possible limitation of the results presented. Yet, when we tested if being insured increased the probability of accessing prenatal care from a health facility higher in the hierarchical structure (e.g. hospitals (private or public), polyclinics, clinics (private or public)) we find no statistically significant impact. Likewise insurance participation does not change the probability of accessing prenatal care from a health facility in the middle of the hierarchical structure (a health center) or in lower in level of the hierarchical structure (e.g.
health posts, CHPS, mobile clinics (private or public) and maternity homes).
Another caveat that should be made explicit is that some women currently insured might not have been so when pregnant. Yet this if anything will tend to weaken the results found for prenatal care.
Models for curative child health care use
We then estimate the impact of being insured on the probability of suffering a fever or a cough in the last two weeks as well as on health care practices such as giving the child anti-malaria medication and seeking formal advice or treatment from a health facility or provider (both conditional on the child suffering a fever or cough and unconditionally). The results are found in Table 5 , where odd columns show results without instrumenting participation in the NHIS, while the even column provide second-stage estimates.
In simple OLS estimations, insurance participation appears to have no statistically significant impact on the probability of suffering a fever or a cough nor on the unconditional and conditional probability of taking anti-malaria medication. Yet, according to the OLS results, being insured has a positive and statistically significant impact on both the unconditional and conditional likelihood of seeking formal medical treatment. Being insured raises the unconditional probability of seeking formal medical treatment for children by 5.7 percentage points, while the probability of seeking formal medical treatment conditional on the child experiencing a fever or cough increases by 20.8 percentage points.
The instrumental variable estimations shows positive and statistically significant coefficients for all health behaviors. As with the OLS estimation the probability of suffering a fever or cough is not affected by insurance status. In contrast, being insured improves the unconditional probabilities of receiving malaria medication and of seeking formal medical treatment by 25.2 and 29.5 percentage points, respectively. The conditional probability of receiving malaria medication is increased 71.8 percentage points by insurance enrollment, while the conditional likelihood of seeking formal medical treatment when suffering a fever or cough increases by 65.5 percentage points. These estimates point to the existence of a downward bias when endogeneity is not taken into account. These results are not surprising, since according to the 2008 Citizens' Assessment of the National Health Insurance Scheme the existence of a problem of information asymmetry in developing countries such as Ghana implies a high likelihood that "high" risk groups could be selected into the scheme
Discussion of the findings
The results found in this section are consistent with coefficients greatly biased downwards in the initial estimations. These biases are consistent with health behaviors in developing country contexts as as discussed earlier. If these biases are not accounted for the impact of participating in a health insurance scheme would be greatly underestimated. The IV estimates are substantially larger than the OLS estimates due, in principle, to the existence of selection which means there is underlying heterogeneity in returns to insurance participation. More importantly, the IV estimates calculate local average treatment effects (LATE) in contrast to the OLS estimates which provide average treatment effects (ATE). According to Angrist (2006) , the IV estimates capture the causal impact of treatment on the treated without being confounded by noncompliance or selection bias. Changes in membership rules are more likely to affect the insurance participation choices of people who would otherwise have much lower probabilities of becoming members (compliers). The IV estimation measures the impact of being insured on the health care utilization rates of these "compliers". ATE is a weighted average of the effect on both the always-takers and the compliers, while LATE only provides information about the compliers (Angrist 2006, Angrist and Pischke 2009) . If the main reason that these parents have low participation rates is because of higher-than-average cost of membership rather than because of lower-than-average returns to participation, then the "local average treatment effect" will be above the average marginal return to insurance participation in the population as a whole. This hypothesis is consistent with Asuming's (2013) findings, which suggest that poorer households have larger unmet need for health services and are more responsive to interventions. Similarly Powell-Jackson et al. 2014 find that the effect of free care on use of primary care becomes larger as the sample is restricted to increasingly sicker (anemic) children. In addition, compliers affected by the existence of non-standard verification methods have a higher likelihood of being first time mothers and of having children who are at least moderately anemic. These inexperienced mothers might not understand the importance of being enrolled in an insurance scheme but could be motivated to enroll when the paperwork becomes less cumbersome. Once enrolled they probably would seek curative health care much more often than the average parent since their inexperience might lead them worry more than a more experienced parent. Similarly, an anemic child would benefit much more from curative care if his/her parents have access to health insurance. Hence mothers with anemic children who due to easiness of enrollment have more access to health insurance will use health services more frequently than the average parent.
Finally, compliers are more likely to live in districts with poor road networks xviii . With access to health insurance parents can afford more expensive health facilities closer to home and do not need to travel to look for cheaper options. Hence parents who live in areas with particularly bad transportation networks might value access to health insurance much more than the average parent and use health services more frequently.
Robustness Checks
To conclude our analysis we tested that the results obtained were robust to including an additional instrument to allow us to estimate the Hansen J-Statistic and to prove the exogeneity of the instrument chosen. The additional instrumental variable included was the existence of nonstandard verification methods in the DMHIS in 2007 (which was much less prevalent with an average of 10% in all DMHIS). A detailed explanation of this robustness check can be found in the Appendix A5. The results show that the main results can be replicated. Yet the results in the main estimation are preferred since the instrument used is stronger and hence we ensure a smaller bias.
Conclusion
The main objective of this research paper is to look at the impact of insurance enrollment in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) on maternal and child curative health care utilization in Ghana. This is the first attempt to look into these particular outcomes using a sample which is representative for the whole country. This study overcomes the difficulties in identifying the effect of joining a health insurance scheme on health behaviors by using an instrumental variable approach. The exogenous variation in the decision to join the National Health Insurance system comes from the unexpected variations in membership rules in the District Mutual Health
Insurance Schemes. Specifically we use as the instrument the existence of non-standard verification methods to allow enrollment of children. We test the exogeneity of the instrument by providing evidence to show government officials in the different DMHIS did not choose to establish this particular membership rule to make it less stringent in districts that had: lower child health care utilization rates or maternal health care quality, lower maternal education levels or higher poverty malaria or fertility rates.
Using this identification strategy, we show that being registered in the DMHIS increases the probability of seeking higher quality maternal health care as well as the likelihood that parents take their children to health facilities more often for curative care. The instrumental variable estimations show positive and statistically significant coefficients. Only the number of prenatal care visits sought appear not to be altered by being insured. This is not an unexpected result since in Ghana, even before the creation of the NHIS the average number of prenatal visits was quite high for developing country standards. The World Health Organization (WHO) (Berg 1995) recommendations in terms of frequency of prenatal care visits are four visits per pregnancy. This is below the average number of prenatal visits, even for uninsured women in Ghana, who seek prenatal care over five times during their pregnancies. It appears that participating in the NHIS improves maternal care not through increases in quantity of care but of quality of care. This is consistent with Powell-Jackson et al. 2014 findings who state in their study that free care promoted a switch from informal services to formal services increasing the quality of providers used.
The rest of the results are consistent with coefficients biased downwards in the initial OLS estimations. If these biases are not accounted for, the impact of participating in a health insurance scheme would be greatly underestimated.
This paper calculates local average treatment effects (LATE) in contrast to average treatment effects (ATE). Since "compliers" have much higher returns to insurance participation, IV estimates are much larger than the average marginal returns to being insured and in general much larger than the average effects found in the literature. This is not a shortcoming of this paper, because, for policy evaluation purposes, it might be more relevant to calculate the average return to insurance participation for the group who will be most impacted by changes in membership rules than to calculate the average marginal return for the whole population. Indeed as mentioned by Powell-Jackson et al. (2014) the impact of health financing reforms might be easier to identify on a subgroup of the population with the highest return to the reform. Future research should focus on analyzing other aspects of the quality of health care services used by members of the NHIS, especially for children. This would allow one to evaluate if the creation of the NHIS has increased not only the quantity of care utilization but also the quality of the services provided for all its beneficiaries.
. i Workers in the formal sector contribute 2.5% of their contribution to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) with annual premiums ranging from GHc 7.2 ($8) to GHc 48 ($54) (Frempong et al. 2009) ii The Ghanaian health care system can be divided into four main groups of delivery systems: public, private-forprofit, private-not-for-profit, and traditional (Salisu and Prinz 2009) .
iii The list of benefits as well as of excluded services is provided in Appendix A.1.
iv The private mutual insurance schemes (also called community base schemes) cover around 0.7% and the private commercial insurance schemes cover 0.07%. v A beneficiary in one district who moves to another district can transfer his/her insurance policy and still be covered in the new district. vi The outcomes whether a woman was weighed while pregnant or if her blood pressure was taken during pregnancy is not included since almost all women in the sample (97%) received these services. vii We tested if the results were sensitive to the 4 month threshold and we found no significant differences for a range of +/-5 months. viii Pregnant women were exempted from paying premiums from July 2008, while the DHS survey took place between September and November 2008. Yet the change in the law should not affect the analysis performed here since the percentage of mothers that would have been affected by it in our sample is minimal. Most women (93%) for which we have both insurance and prenatal care information gave birth by July 2008. Indeed we tested if excluding women that gave birth after July 2008 changed the results and they did not ix These two covariates are relevant for curative care and preventive care but not for maternal care.
x This is a relevant covariate for maternal care and preventive care but not for curative care. xi Mother's educational attainment is defined as a categorical variable: no education=0, incomplete primary=1, complete primary=2, incomplete secondary=3, complete secondary=4 and higher than secondary education=5 xii We omit controls for whether the mother is currently pregnant, and whether the mother is currently working since they could be endogenous. xiii Household wealth was chosen for this study instead of individual income because income data is not available in the DHS survey. The survey has a wealth indicator based on a series of household characteristics (flooring, walls and ceiling materials, ownership of goods, toilet facilities, and type of cooking fuel, and such). xiv This dummy defines the area as urban or rural. xv District scheme manager on exemption policy: "When you go to a community, you will realize that they are all farmers. You can't determine the income level at the end of the day so how do you determine the poor, the poorer and, the poorest in that community? Why not ask everybody to pay the same premium? Yaa, so we have decided that they should all pay the same." Source: Sulzbach, S. 2008 "Evaluating the Impact of National Health Insurance in Ghana" Health Systems 20/20 -Power Point presentation xvi It should be acknowledged that membership rules on children's membership such as the existence of non-standard verification methods -affect child's utilization of services through the child's membership. They may only indirectly affect mother's membership. Yet the independent variable of interest used in this study is the impact of mother's membership in the NHIS since the GDHS does not report child's enrollment. xvii A set of instruments is defined as being weak if the concentration parameter is small enough that inferences based on conventional normal approximating distributions are misleading. The concentration parameter is a unit-less measure of the strength of the instruments (Stock et al. 2002) . One measure of whether a set of instruments is strong is whether the concentration parameter is sufficiently large. xviii Non-standard verification methods might imply that parents registering the children would have to make several trips to the DMHIS to achieve this. This would be particularly cumbersome and hence prove to be a much stronger deterrent to insurance enrollment when roads are in poor condition and trips to the DMHIS are much more time consuming. nd stage variables), mother's age and educational attainment, whether the mother is married, if she is Christian or Moslem, the number of children born in the last 5 years, the number of living children older than 5, sex of the household head, the household's wealth level, the place of residence (urban vs. rural) , the population level in each region (in millions), a dummy if the household belongs to one of the three poorest regions in Ghana, a dummy for belonging to Greater Accra region the distance from the district to the nearest doctor and the nearest government hospital (in km), the number of facilities per 100,000 people in each region, the presence of deficient human resources in DMHIS, the # of facilities accredited in 2007 and in 2008, the % of partner's in the region that are self-employed in agriculture, the lack of health care facilities and providers of high quality in the district; the existence of a poor road network in the district; the high prevalence of divorce or single parenthood in the district; and the low levels of education in the district as well as the preference for traditional medicine or self-medication. 1 We combined first stage estimations when the coefficients were identical, as well as the N, partial R 2 and F-statistic. Robust standard errors clustered by district level in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls: if the child was a twin, mother's age and educational attainment, whether the mother is married, if she is Christian or Moslem, the number of children born in the last 5 years, the number of living children older than 5, sex of the household head, the household's wealth level, the place of residence, the population level in each region (in millions), a dummy if the household belongs to one of the three poorest regions in Ghana, a dummy for belonging to Greater Accra region the distance from the district to the nearest doctor and the nearest government hospital (in km), the number of facilities per 100,000 people in each region, the presence of deficient human resources in DMHIS, the # of facilities accredited in 2007 and in 2008, the % of partner's in the region that are self-employed in agriculture, the lack of health care facilities and providers of high quality in the district, the existence of a poor road network in the district, the high prevalence of divorce or single parenthood in the district, and the low levels of education in the district as well as the preference for traditional medicine or self-medication. Instrument: the existence of a nonstandard verification method in 2008. Robust standard errors clustered by district level in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Christian or Moslem the number of children born in the last 5 years, the number of living children older than 5, sex of the household head, the household's wealth level, the place of residence, the population level in each region (in millions), a dummy if the household belongs to one of the three poorest regions in Ghana, a dummy for belonging to Greater Accra region the distance from the district to the nearest doctor and the nearest government hospital (in km), the number of facilities per 100,000 people in each region, the presence of deficient human resources in DMHIS, the # of facilities accredited in 2007 and in 2008, the % of partner's in the region that are self-employed in agriculture, the lack of health care facilities and providers of high quality in the district; the existence of a poor road network in the district; the high prevalence of divorce or single parenthood in the district; and the low levels of education in the district as well as the preference for traditional medicine or self-medication. Instrument: the existence of a non-standard verification method in 2008. Robust standard errors clustered by district level in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Second we run separate regressions for the instrument chosen on each of the outcomes examined in the paper using data at the district level. Again, the only controls we use is a dummy that is equal to one if the household belongs to one of the three poorest regions in Ghana and a dummy equal to one if it belongs to the Greater Accra region. We find that almost none of the 2003 maternal health practices or curative health practices have statistically significant impacts on the membership rule.. The results are shown in Table A3 . Given these results we are not concerned that our estimates would be biased.
A.3. Addressing sample selection
A woman has to seek prenatal care first before she chooses the quality of such care. Similarly the child has to report being recently sick with fever or cough to be included in the sample that received curative care. One might be concerned that these women and children could potentially be different from the population as a whole in terms of their NHIS status or other background variables which could lead to an imprecise estimation of the scheme impact. Yet in the case of prenatal care quality this is a minor concern since almost all women in the sample had at least one prenatal visit (96.2%). For the women that did not have prenatal visits we can replace the missing values in the prenatal quality dummies by zeros, and estimate the unconditional effect of participating in the NHIS. We would expect that women that self-select out of prenatal care (due to confidence selection or adverse selection) would also not be interested in higher levels of prenatal care quality xix .
For the sample of children that received curative care it is even more important to address the selection problem since only 20% of children in the sample experience a fever or cough.
Moreover the behaviors that correlate with not being sick could not translate into seeking less curative care. Hence we estimate both the conditional and the unconditional effect of being enrolled in the NHIS, by again replacing the missing values (the cases were children did not experience a fever or cough) in the curative care dummies with zeros in one set of the estimations.
A.4 Addressing statistical issues
It should be mentioned that when dealing with dichotomous variables in both the first and the second stages of the IV estimation, the standard estimation techniques (2SLS) could not be appropriate. Extending ordinary least squares to a linear probability model produces inefficient estimates with heteroscedastic standard errors. Furthermore functional form problems are created since linear and additive specifications are imposed on non-linear relationships (Timpone 2001 ).Yet, moving from linear probability models to maximum likelihood estimators in order to address endogeneity issues can result in further complexity and not much gain for the researcher.
Following the maximum likelihood approach, the reduced form equation in the first stage is estimated using a Probit model and the untransformed predicted z-value from this stage replaces the endogenous explanatory variable in the second stage (Timpone 2001) . The second stage is also estimated using a Probit model since the dependent variables is likewise dichotomous.
Using this two stage approach consistent estimates will be obtained for the second stage, however the parameters will require re-scaling transformations for substantive interpretation.
More importantly, the standard errors will be incorrect and correcting them is in fact exceedingly challenging (Timpone 2001) . Given these limitations, linear probability models have been the method endorsed and implemented in the literature (Timpone 2001) . A relatively recent alternative is the use of Bivariate Probit (BVP) which outperforms IV estimations in terms of the size of the average percent absolute bias generated by the estimation, especially for large samples (Terza et al. 2008 ). Yet, as shown by Terza et al. 2008 , for small samples the bias differences between IV and BVP are trivial.
Given that the sample sizes used in this study are relatively small, we decided to use a linear probability model for both stages and correct the estimates using weighted least squares in order to address the heroscedasticity that is created.
A.5 Robustness checks
We replicated our main estimations using an alternative empirical strategy where we include an additional instrument. We use as an additional instrument the presence of non-standard verification methods in the DMHIS in 2006. We need to include an additional instrument in order to perform the Hansen's J test, a test of the exogeneity of the instruments. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The second instrument is not statistically significant. Yet, the over-identification test is easily accepted in all cases. These results are displayed at the end of Table A4 in the appendix.
The statistical significance of most of the coefficients has stayed the same. The only two exceptions are the likelihood of a woman being told about pregnancy complications during prenatal visits and the probability that a child receives malaria medication which slightly reduced their significance from 5% to 10%. . All the coefficients that were previously not statistically significant are still not significant. . The combination of the instruments used is weaker than the one used in the main estimations (the F statistic of the instruments chosen ensured that the maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS is no bigger than 20% in most of the estimations in contrast to 10% in all the main estimations) which could potentially lead to biased estimates. Most of the coefficients for the statistically significant outcomes have changed, on average by 6%. These results show that the main results can be replicated using this different estimation technique. Yet the results in the main estimation are preferred since the instrument used is much stronger and hence we ensure a smaller bias.
xix We measure prenatal care quality using the following outcomes: the number of tetanus injections a woman had while pregnant, if pregnant women were told about pregnancy complications during prenatal visits, if these women were weighed while pregnant, if their blood pressure was taken during their pregnancy and if they had urine and blood samples taken during pregnancy Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
